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CRIMINAL LAW-CHILD ABUSE RESULTING IN DEATH-AR-
KANSAS AMENDS ITS FIRST DEGREE MURDER STATUTE. Midgett v.
State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).
Eight year old Ronnie Midgett, Jr., died at the hands of his fa-
ther amid circumstances of prolonged and brutal physical abuse. The
autopsy revealed multiple bruises, abrasions, and rib fractures, both
healed and unhealed. The boy was poorly nourished. The immediate
cause of death was intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to blunt force
trauma, an injury consistent with that of a blow to the stomach with a
fist. The boy's ten-year-old sister testified that four days prior to Ron-
nie's death the father was drinking whiskey and beating the boy, strik-
ing him on the stomach and the back. She further testified that she
had seen the father choke Ronnie on previous occasions. Inquiries by
school personnel and a social worker who noticed the bruises and the
lethargic behavior of the child revealed only a story of a rough-play-
ing little brother. Ronnie did not complain about the abusive
treatment. I
The State charged the father with first degree murder2 and ob-
tained a conviction after a jury trial. On appeal, the father argued
that despite the abuse of the child, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he killed the boy with the requisite premeditated and delib-
erated purpose of causing his death. The Arkansas Supreme Court
agreed that no such evidence existed and modified the conviction to
second degree murder.3 Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d
410 (1987).
In response to the Midgett decision the state Attorney General's
office drafted a bill with the intention of broadening the scope of first
1. The conduct of both the offender and the victim and the nature of the injuries to the
victim are typical of what is known as the "battered child snydrome." The snydrome is char-
acterized by a pattern of "physically correlated symptoms" identified by the medical commu-
nity as explainable only by "intentional ill treatment." Note, The Battered Child: Logic in
Search of the Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 365-68 (1971).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a) (Supp. 1987) states in part that "[a] person commits
murder in the first degree if... [w]ith the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the
death of another person, he causes the death of any person . ."
3. The Midgett court specifically cited ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a) (1987). "A per-
son commits murder in the second degree if ... [w]ith the purpose of causing serious physical
injury to another person, he causes the death of any person. Id.
The sentence for first degree murder is ten years to forty years, or life. The sentence for
second degree murder is. five years to twenty years. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401 (1987).
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degree murder to include cases of child abuse resulting in death.
Upon introduction at the request of the Attorney General, the Arkan-
sas legislature immediately passed the bill and amended the statute,
adding the provision that "[a] person commits murder in the first de-
gree if ... [u]nder circumstances manifesting cruel and malicious in-
difference to the value of human life, he knowingly causes the death of
a person fourteen years of age or younger."4
This legislative response follows the public attention and revul-
sion that now exist in society with respect to chid abuse in general.5
However, the traditional statutory grading of criminal offenses, and
specifically the classifying of murder by degrees, appear inadequate to
address the range of public concern now focused on child abuse.6 A
comparison of various other statutory formulations and the struggle
of other courts to punish child abuse resulting in death will help to
illustrate the uniqueness of the General Assembly's response in Ar-
kansas and highlight the need for further revisions.
The homicide statutes of many states require premeditation and
deliberation as the criminal intent or mens rea necessary for higher
degrees of culpability.7 Some courts find these elements satisfied in
circumstances similar to those in Midgett.8 These courts infer pre-
meditation and deliberation from the nature and extent of the injuries
4. Act of June 4. 1987, No. 52 (1st Ext. Sess.) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
102(a)(3) (Supp. 1987)). An emergency clause expressly refers to Midgett and states: "[The]
confusion with reference to the application of Arkansas' first degree murder statute to child
abuse cases resulting in death [requires] the immediate passage of this Act .. . in order to
clearly establish Arkansas' first degree murder statute to be applicable in such cases." Id. at
§ 2.
5. The identification of injuries that are a result of child abuse, a record of the incidence
of such abuse, and the legislative response to the problem are developments only of the last
forty years. See generally Meyers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse.- In the Best Interest of
the Child, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1986).
6. In a case of child abuse not resulting in death, the debate is between the imposition of
criminal sanctions versus a therapeutic approach to dealing with the offender. Meyers, supra
note 5, at 178-79. The attention to the social and psychological context in which the offense
occurs presents difficult problems of defining the conduct and applying legal remedies. See
generally Shepherd, The Abused Child And The Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182 (1965).
7. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West
1970); IDAHO CODE § 18-4001 (1987) (malice aforethought); MD. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 407
(1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010
(Michie 1985).
8. See, e.g., Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985) (thirteen-month-old
child brutally abused over a period of months leading to death) (overruled by Midgett); Morris
v. State, 270 Ind. 295, 384 N.E.2d 1022 (1979) (five-month-old baby died from a skull fracture
caused by blows to the face and having its head hit on the floor several times); Hern v. State, 97
Nev. 529, 635 P.2d 278 (1981) (multiple bruises and abrasions covering a three-year-old child
found as the undisputed cause of death held sufficient to establish the requisite premeditation).
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and from a liberal construction of the time required to deliberate, al-
lowing the formation of the intent in an instant.9 However, other
courts find insufficient evidence of these requisite elements of intent
for a first degree murder conviction in a death resulting from child
abuse.' 0 The courts find no evidence of time sufficient to form the
intention" or that no evidence of prior mistreatment or threatening
conduct existed toward the child.'2 The inconsistency and difficulty
in applying the concepts of premeditation and deliberation are recog-
nized by many authorities. 3 The recently revised criminal laws of
several states no longer use these concepts to distinguish the more
culpable murder offense.' 4
9. See, e.g., Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 698 S.W.2d 95 (1985); Morris v. State, 270
Ind. 295, 384 N.E.2d 1022 (1979); Hem v. State, 97 Nev. 529, 635 P.2d 278 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 317, 372 N.E.2d 246, 252 (1978)
(A four-year-old boy died from a twenty-minute beating inflicted by hand. Injuries, inflicted
before and after this beating, covered a considerable portion of the child's body. The court
stated that "there is an irreducible doubt in all the circumstances whether the defendant con-
sciously formed a purpose that morning to do the child mortal injury; but if the defendant did,
it is still probable that the resolve lasted for only 'a fleeting period of time.' " (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 152, 301 N.E.2d 683, 688 (1983))); People v. Ingra-
ham, 232 N.Y. 245, 133 N.E. 575 (1921) (A father strangled to death his six-year-old
daughter. The defendant's hands around the girl's throat for several minutes before causing
death was held insufficient to indicate premeditation.); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244,
38 S.E.2d 457 (1946) (Defendant brutally beat his eleven-year-old daughter with a half-inch
switch inflicting wounds from which she eventually died. The court found no evidence that
the defendant previously mistreated or made any prior threats against the girl and, therefore,
found no evidence of premeditation.); see Comment, Commonwealth v. Cadwell: Deliberate
Premeditation, Extreme Atrocity and Cruelty, and the Battered Child Syndrome-A New Look
at Criminal Culpability in Massachusetts, 14 NEW. ENG. 812 (1979) (suggesting that the Cad-
well court considers the child abuse syndrome as a mitigating factor in the resulting death).
11. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978).
12. See, e.g. Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 38 S.E.2d 457 (1946).
13. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 338 (M. Hall ed.
1967) (suggesting that the distinction between degrees of murder based on premeditation and
deliberation is too vague and obscure for either a jury or an experienced judge to understand);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Pt. II, at 127-28
(1980) (stating that the "notion that prior reflection should distinguish . . .murder is funda-
mentally unsound").
14. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). A person
"commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (1) He either
intends to kill or do great bodily harm .. . or knows that such acts will cause death. . or...
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm . " Id.
The statute takes into account the aggravating factors that "the murdered individual was
under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty .... Id. at § (b)7; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (Burns Supp.
1987) (knowingly or intentionally kills another); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1975)
("[w]ith intent to cause the death..."). "Intent" is generally defined similarly to "purposely"
as used in the Model Penal Code, requiring a "conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result; and... if the element involves the nature of attendant circum-
stances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
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As an alternative basis for a first degree murder conviction, Mas-
sachusetts provides for murder committed with "extreme atrocity or
cruelty."' 5 Premeditation is not required. 6 In Commonwealth v.
Cadwell' the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held the particu-
lar circumstances of child abuse resulting in death "much less persua-
sive of extreme cruelty than is commonly found in convictions on that
basis."" The court found that "the previous assaults [on the child]
were physically distinct from the final assault; they were not them-
selves an accumulative cause of death."' 9  However, in Common-
wealth v. Hutchinson2 ° the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
distinguished Cadwell on the basis of more severe injuries inflicted
upon the child and upheld a first degree murder conviction under the
extreme atrocity and cruelty provision.2' The court's struggle with
the particular circumstances of death from child abuse sufficient to
warrant a conviction points out the difficulty of addressing the issue
within the framework of existing statutory formulations.
Several jurisdictions designate murder by torture as a first degree
offense and find it applicable to deaths by child abuse.22 Murder by
exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1974); Accord N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1987).
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970).
16. Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 318, 372 N.E.2d 246, 252 (1978) (citing
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 358 Mass. 407, 415, 265 N.E.2d 485, 491 (1970)).
17. 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978) (prolonged abuse over several months
culminated in a twenty-minute beating that caused the death).
18. Id. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252. " 'Our cases have usually looked to the consciousness
and degree of suffering of the victim, the disproportion between the means actually needed to
inflict death and those employed, the instrumentalities employed and the extent of physical
injury.'" Id. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252-53 (quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass.
617, 628, 255 N.E.2d 191, 198 (1970)).
19. Id. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252.
20. 395 Mass. 568, 481 N.E.2d 188 (1985).
21. Id. The Hutchinson court distinguished Cadwell on the basis of the severity of the
injuries resulting when the child's head was beaten repeatedly against a wall. Additionally, the
court stated that "the defendant, unlike the defendant in the Cadwell case, received the benefit
of the jury's consideration [through a jury instruction] of any impairment of ... mind which
may typify adults that batter children." Id. at 578, 481 N.E.2d at 194-95.
The circumstances of Midgett are much closer to those of Cadwell than to those of Hutch-
inson. Additionally, the Midgett court analyzes the state of mind of the defendant, as does the
Cadwell court.
22. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970) ("All murder which is perpetrated by
means of a bomb, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing"); IDAHO CODE § 18-4001 (1987) ("Torture is the intentional infliction of
extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering. It shall also be torture to inflict
on a human being extreme and prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to
cause suffering. The death of a human being caused by such torture is murder irrespective of
[Vol. 10:785
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torture requires no intent to cause death.23 However, the intention to
inflict prolonged pain and suffering upon the victim remains a key
element of proof.24 The condition of the decedent's body and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the killing provide inferences of this intent.25
Most cases require infliction of pain for the purpose of revenge, per-
suasion, extortion, or satisfaction of some sadistic inclination.26 The
inconsistent results of cases that attempt to apply premeditation and
deliberation in order to distinguish between degrees of murder are
also present under the murder by torture formulation. The result
turns on the particular construction of these mens rea requirements. 27
Prosecuting a death resulting from child abuse under the felony
murder doctrine provides the advantage of not having to prove the
vague concepts of premeditation and deliberation. The State must
proof of specific intent to kill; torture causing death shall be deemed the equivalent of intent to
kill.").
See, e.g., People v. Demond, 59 Cal. App. 3d 574, 130 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1976) (three-year-
old died from injuries typical of the battered child syndrome: murder by torture conviction
upheld); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985) (murder by torture conviction
upheld in the death of a three-year-old boy by prolonged and brutal abuse). Cf State v.
Kountz, 108 Ariz. 459, 501 P.2d 931 (1972) (torture conviction upheld when the child was
systematically and cruelly tortured with intent to cause extreme pain and suffering); People v.
Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665 (1976) (first degree murder by torture
conviction in a case of child abuse resulting in death modified to second degree murder on the
grounds that the offense requires a deliberated and premeditated intent to inflict pain).
23. See, e.g., State v. Kountz, 108 Ariz. 459, 501 P.2d 931 (1972); People v. Demond, 59
Cal. App. 3d 574, 130 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1976); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833
(1985).
24. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985).
25. Id. The severity of the victim's wounds alone may not supply an inference of the
requisite intent. In California murder by torture is a form of premeditated murder, requiring
similar evidence of intent to cause pain to the victim as evidence of intent to kill. People v.
Steger, 16 Cal. 3d 539, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665 (1976). The Steger court found no
evidence that the continuous infliction of pain and injury upon the child was not several dis-
tinct explosions of violence. " '[T]he abuser tends to suffer from emotional pressures which are
not directly related to the child himself, focuses his own general feelings of frustration and
anger on the one child, and expresses his emotions through an uncontrolled display of physical
abuse of the child.'" Id. at 549, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 167, 546 P.2d at 671 n.4 (quoting Note, The
Battered Child: Logic in Search of the Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 375 (1971)). But see
People v. Demond, 59 Cal. App. 3d 574, 130 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1976) (finding no mitigating
circumstances of drugs or alcohol or of heat of passion to diminish the defendant's capacity to
premeditate).
26. Apparently these purposes add to the inference gained solely from the condition of the
body. Evidence of the defendant's sadistic treatment of others, State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,
715 P.2d 833 (1985), and evidence that a defendant forced the child to eat her own feces,
suggesting conduct prompted by sadistic impulses, People v. Demond, 59 Cal. App. 3d 574,
130 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1976), helped create inferences sufficient for convictions of murder by
torture.
27. Characterizing the Midgett decision as adopting a strict construction of premeditation
does not infer a premeditated intent to cause suffering under a murder by torture formulation.
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only show an intent to commit the felony itself.28 The majority of
jurisdictions include felony murder in their first degree provisions,29
but few contain enumerated or defined offenses that encompass the
conduct of child abuse.3" Successful felony murder convictions in-
clude those based on the felonies of aggravated battery3 l and cruelty
to children. 32 The felony of mayhem, defined in part as the perma-
nent disabling of the victim, may support a conviction of murder
under the doctrine.3 3 A potential problem with the felony murder
approach arises with the concept of merger. The acts constituting
child abuse, merging into the resulting homicide, may preclude a con-
viction of felony murder.3 4
In Midgett v. State35 the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that
"[u]nless our law is changed to permit conviction of first degree mur-
der for something like child abuse or torture resulting in death, ' ' 36 the
State must show substantial evidence that an accused acted with pre-
meditation and deliberation to obtain a conviction "no matter how
28. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5
(1986).
29. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1978); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (1987).
30. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (1984) (general felony murder provision). The Geor-
gia Code contains the felony of cruelty to children:
A parent, guardian, or other persons supervising the welfare of or having immediate
charge or custody of a child under the age of 18 commits the offense of cruelty to
children when he willfully deprives the child of necessary sustenance to the extent
that the child's health or well-being is jeopardized. (b) Any person commits the
offense of cruelty to children when he maliciously causes a child under the age of 18
cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.
Id. § 16-5-70 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) ("com-
mitting a forcible felony other than second degree murder"); MD. PENAL CODE ANN. § 410
(1985) (mayhem is an enumerated felony generally defined as maiming in MD. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 384, 386 (1985)).
31. People v. Ray, 80 Ill. App. 3d 151, 35 Ill. Dec. 688, 399 N.E.2d 977 (1979).
32. Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983).
33. See McKenna, A Case Study of Child Abuse: A Former Prosecutor's View, 12 AMER.
CRIM. LAW REV. 165 (1974) (discussing Maryland v. Stem, Crim. No. 12790 (Montgomery
Co. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 271 (Md. Ct. Sp. App., filed Apr. 3, 1973)).
34. "Some cases have held that the collateral felony must be a felony which is 'independ-
ent' of the conduct which kills; it must involve conduct separate from the acts of personal
violence which constitute a necessary part of the homicide itself." 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 28, § 7.5, at 229 (1986). The merger doctrine prevents 'bootstrapping' of lesser
offenses of violence to the person without the necessary proof of any intent to cause death. See
also People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 3d 798, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886 (1984) (held that the
acts constituting the felony of child abuse in California form an integral part of the homicide
consequently merging into the homicide).
35. 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).
36. Id. at 287, 729 S.W.2d at 414.
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heinous the facts may otherwise be."'37 The court overruled Burnett v.
State"8 which held the required mental state was properly inferred
from the substantial evidence of abuse inflicted upon a child. Just as
the Indiana court failed to do in Morris v. State,39 the Arkansas court
found no explanation in Burnett for "the quantum leap from 'the
facts,' horrible as they were, to the inference of premeditation. '"4
The Midgett court stated that a distinction remains between first
degree and second degree murder under the Arkansas statute. 41 Prior
case law in Arkansas recognized a notion of instantaneous premedita-
tion.42 However, requiring no evidence of any appreciable time for
reflection on the part of a defendant destroys the statutory distinc-
tion.43  The court found no evidence to show that the appellant
"formed that intention before acting, and... weighed in his mind the
consequences of a course of conduct, as distinguished from acting
upon sudden impulse without the exercise of reasoning power."
44
Finding no statement made or other demonstration "that the ap-
pellant was abusing his son in the hope that he would eventually
die,"' 45 the court offered a possible explanation of the state of mind of
the appellant. In a case of child abuse of long duration, since the
child has not died from previous instances of abuse, the offender may
expect the child not to die as the result of further abuse.46 Addition-
ally, since he did not kill his son in a previous beating, with the clear
opportunity to do so, the inference that he planned his son's death in
accordance with the concepts of premeditation and deliberation is ne-
gated.47 The court further stated that even if the evidence supported a
37. Id.
38. 287 Ark. 158, 697 S.W.2d 95 (1985) (A thirteen-month-old child died from a rupture
of the colon caused by a blow with a fist to the abdomen. The autopsy revealed multiple
bruises and abrasions covering the entire body, four broken ribs and other internal injuries in
various stages of the healing process.).
39. 270 Ind. 245, 384 N.E.2d 1022 (1979).
40. 292 Ark. at 284, 729 S.W.2d at 412.
41. Id. at 287, 729 S.W.2d at 414.
42. Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978).
43. 292 Ark. at 286, 729 S.W.2d at 414 (quoting 2 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
28, § 7.7, at 237 (1986)).
44. Id. at 285, 729 S.W.2d at 413 (citing Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1022 (1980)). This language comes from the Arkansas Model Jury Instruc-
tions. See ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AMCI 1507 (1982).
45. 292 Ark. at 283, 729 S.W.2d at 412.
46. Id. at 285, 729 S.W.2d at 413.
47. Id. (citing Simmons v. State, 227 Ark. 1109, 305 S.W.2d 119 (1957)) (The Simmons
court noted that opportunities the defendant had to kill his victims after obtaining his shotgun
but before the killings negated premeditation.); Cf Tippet v. State, 224 Ark. 981, 278 S.W.2d
1987-88]
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finding that intent to cause death "developed in a drunken, mis-
guided, and overheated attempt at disciplining"48 the child, still no
evidence at all of a premeditated and deliberated killing existed.4 9
Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis for the inference of
premeditation." That evidence includes the type of weapon used in
the killing, the manner of its use,5 "the nature, extent and location of
the wounds inflicted, [and] the conduct of the accused." 5 2 The
Midgett court recognized that "a fist may be a deadly weapon, [but]
the evidence of the use of the fist in this case is not comparable to the
evidence"53 found in prior cases consisting of other more substantial
circumstances. 4
The dissent in Midgett, willing to read premeditation into these
circumstances of child abuse resulting in death, supported the verdict
of the trial court.55 The dissent stated that the majority apparently
could accept the appellant's intention to kill the child if he were
"murdered with a bullet or a knife."5 6 This suggests a notion that the
risk created by the use of a dangerous weapon affords a sufficient in-
ference of intent. The use of the fist in this case, in light of the relative
strengths of the appellant and the victim, also created a risk sufficient
to sustain the inference.
110 (1955) (a first degree murder conviction upheld where the condition of the victim's body
showed a prolonged beating although it was shown appellant had the means and opportunity
L , his wife instantly).
48. 292 Ark. at 285, 729 S.W.2d at 413.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 282, 729 S.W.2d at 411 (citing House v. State, 230 Ark. 622, 324 S.W.2d 112
(1959)). In House a man attempted to have sexual intercourse with a woman and after a
protracted fight, he dumped the body in a water-filled ditch not knowing whether she was dead
or alive. Leaving her in the water and having time to premeditate during the fight proved
sufficient for the inference of premeditation.
51. Id. at 283, 729 S.W.2d at 412 (citing Weldon v. State, 168 Ark. 534, 270 S.W.2d 968
(1925) (three bullet wounds through the center of the victim's body and mutilation with a knife
held sufficient to infer premeditation)).
52. Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 360, 565 S.W.2d 23, 26 (1978).
53. 292 Ark. at 283, 729 S.W.2d at 412.
54. Id. The prior cases referred to by the court are House v. State, 230 Ark. 622, 324
S.W.2d 112 (1959) and Weldon v. State, 168 Ark. 534, 270 S.w.2d 968 (1925). Apparently,
walking away from the victim in the water-filled ditch after fighting for some period of time
provided the other circumstance in the House case. 292 Ark. at 288, 729 S.W.2d at 415. In
Weldon, the " 'overkill' and mutilation of the body.., were circumstances creating substantial
evidence of premeditation and deliberation." Id.
In its petition for rehearing the State said, "It is unclear to the appellee on what basis
'other circumstances' in those cases were sufficient to distinguish them from the circumstances
of the instant case." Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 5, reh'g denied, Midgett v. State, 292
Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).
55. 292 Ark. at 289, 729 S.W.2d at 415 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 291, 729 S.W.2d at 416 (Hickman, J., dissenting).
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In questioning the majority and its inquiry into the state of mind
of the appellant, the dissent asks: "How do we ever know the actual
or subliminal intent of a defendant? 'If the act appellant intended was
criminal, then the law holds him accountable, even though such a
result was not intended.'-5 This analysis, however, does not con-
form with the statutory guidelines of culpable mental states as they
affect the separate elements of criminal offenses.5 8
The legislative response provoked by Midgett provides the pri-
mary significance of the decision. The amendment to the first degree
murder statute apparently equates "circumstances manifesting cruel
and malicious indifference to the value of human life, [when one]
knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or
younger"5 9 with child abuse resulting in death. However, in view of
the Midgett court's analysis of the existing evidence to make an infer-
ence of the appellant's state of mind, the amendment may not encom-
pass the facts of Midgett, despite the clear legislative intent.
The amendment requires a mens rea of "knowingly" causing
death.' As defined by the Arkansas Code, one "knowingly" causes a
result of an offense if he acts with an awareness that "it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result."6 1 The court in
Midgett suggested that the appellant may well have come to expect
that the child would not die from further abuse.62 This suggestion
does not reconcile easily with a required finding that the appellant in
Midgett meets the "knowing" standard and was aware to a "practical
certainty" that death would result from his actions.
The second degree murder statute contains a provision similar to
the amendment with a culpable mental state of "knowingly." 63 In
57. Id. at 290, 729 S.W.2d at 416 (Hickman, J., dissenting) (quoting Hankins v. State, 206
Ark. 881, 884, 178 S.W.2d 56, 58 (1944)).
58. The "culpable mental states, taken in conjunction with the three possible constituents
of an offense--conduct, attendant circumstances, and result-serve to define each Code of-
fense. In other words, under the Code, every offense is defined so as to require that a person
act either purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently with respect to conduct, attendant
circumstances, and/or the result of such conduct." Commentary to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
203 (1977) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202 (1987)).
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).
60. Id.
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(2) (1987) (additionally, knowledge of attendant circum-
stances by the actor requires an awareness that such circumstances exist).
62. 292 Ark. at 285, 729 S.W.2d at 413.
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a) (1987) states that "[a] person commits murder in the
second degree if... [h]e knowingly causes the death of another person under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life .... "
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Johnson v. State' the court strictly interpreted the "knowing" stan-
dard under the second degree provision. The accused, in firing a gun
at his intended victim, killed a bystander across the street. Distin-
guishing a situation of shooting into a crowd of people, and noting
that the victim was not part of a group of people present on the street
at that time, the court found insufficient evidence that the accused
"knowingly" caused the death of the bystander. By analogy, because
four days passed from the last incidence of abuse to the day the child
in Midgett died,65 arguably the father's blows were not directed with
such force to justify an inference that he "knowingly" caused the
death, that is, that the boy was "practically certain" to die from the
abuse.
However, it does not appear that the Arkansas Supreme Court
applies the "knowing" standard consistently. In Boone v. State66 the
court affirmed a conviction of second degree murder in a case of child
abuse resulting in death. A mother allowed the repeated exposure of
her four-year-old son to beatings inflicted by her fianc6. The court
stated that "[t]here is no doubt that appellant could not have been
around the child without knowledge of such abuse."' 67 The court did
not address the knowledge requirement in terms of a "practical cer-
tainty" regarding the result of the conduct.
Assuming that a case of child abuse resulting in death will war-
rant an inference of "knowing" conduct, then the question becomes
one of the limits to application of the amendment. For example, if a
parent acts upon a sudden impulse on one occasion only, and in a
heated rage kills the child, will the language of the amendment sup-
port a first degree conviction? Conceding that the parent's awareness
of the consequences of the action is sufficient for the inference of in-
tent, the inquiry turns to the attendant circumstances of the offense:
the manifesting of a "cruel and malicious indifference" 68 as opposed
to an "extreme indifference" 69 to the value of human life. The amend-
ment's formulation perhaps distinguishes between circumstances of
the battered child syndrome and a more acute, instantaneous instance
of child abuse.
However, to concede that the amendment applies to the single
impulsive act causing death may broaden its scope so as to encompass
64. 270 Ark. 992, 606 S.W.2d 752 (1980).
65. 292 Ark. at 281-82, 729 S.W.2d at 411.
66. 282 Ark. 274, 668 S.W.2d 17 (1984).
67. Id. at 277, 668 S.W.2d at 20.
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).
69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a)(2) (1987).
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fact situations much different than that of Midgett. Conduct previ-
ously found less culpable may warrant a first degree murder convic-
tion simply because of the age of the victim. 70 If the bystander in
Johnson happened to be a ten-year-old child, does the amendment ap-
ply despite the Johnson court's interpretation of "knowing" conduct
and make the inference of intent sufficient for a first degree murder
conviction?
The Midgett decision shows the intent of the court to retain the
substantive distinctions made by the grading of offenses. In response,
the amendment addresses the emotional issue of child abuse and man-
dates the culpability for a resulting death. Despite the legislative in-
tent, a question remains of the current status of Arkansas law in
effecting the policy of culpability in circumstances such as Midgett.
The scope of the amendment will depend upon the court's drawing
the difficult distinctions between culpable mental states.
Paul H. Taylor
70. For example, consider a street fight in which a fourteen year old, cut by a knife,
eventually dies as a result of the wound. A court compelled to find sufficient evidence for a
first degree conviction in a single incident of abuse directed toward a child may broaden the
scope of the amendment to apply to the above fact situation.
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